

# Does VDAB Training Influences Re-Employment? A Duration Analysis

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**KU LEUVEN**

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# Does VDAB Training Influences Re-Employment? A Duration Analysis

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## Abstract

We estimate the effect of training on the duration of the unemployment spell for people who became unemployed. To that effect we use the timing of events approach, jointly modeling the waiting time till training and unemployment duration with a common frailty. Our results point to a significant locking in effect but also to a positive effect of training lasting for 2 years.

## 1 Introduction

The question whether some active labor market programs (ALMP), such as job search assistance, subsidized employment<sup>1</sup> or labor market training, has an effect on the labor market outcomes of the participants, seems pertinent to all parties concerned: the unemployed, unemployment agencies and governments. Their main goal is to integrate unemployed or otherwise disadvantaged individuals into the workforce, using one of the following strategies Heckman et al. (1999, p.2043): increasing human capital, improving work habits, helping job search or some combination of them. Consequently, the substantial body of literature on ALMPs mainly considers labor market outcomes (Heckman et al., 1999, p.2044), such as earnings and wages, employment rates, unemployment exit rates, claims of unemployment benefits, . . . . In general following conclusions seem to hold: (i) wage subsidies (WS) and job search assistance (JSA) programs can be effective in increasing participants' employment probability; (ii) training programs, be it classroom or on the job, are ineffective in the short run, but seem to exhibit some positive medium term effects; (iii) direct employment programs in the public sector are frequently not effective; (iv) all impact estimates are very sensitive to the method used (Heckman et al., 1999, p.2066); (v) all impact estimates exhibit heterogeneity both geographically and among demographic and skill groups (Heckman et al., 1999, p.2054). For meta-analyses (and, hence overviews of the literature) see Heckman et al. (1999) and more recently Card et al. (2010). Studies covering specific geographic areas include Greenberg et al. (2003) for the US and Kluve (2010) for the EU.

Existing research on the effectiveness of training programs as ALMP instrument comes in in two flavors. On the one hand there are the so-called experimentalists: proponents of (quasi-)randomized controlled trials (RCT) (for example Ham and Lalonde, 1996; Eberwein et al., 1997), while on the other hand we have the advocates of the (structural) econometric method (*EM*), which jointly models the outcome together with an explicit choice mechanism, thus alleviating or even completely bypassing the need for RCTs in order to evaluate the impact of social policies such as training programs. For a

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<sup>1</sup>Subsidized employment not only consists of wage subsidies, but also of direct (temporary) job creation in the public sector, although the latter seems recently less fashionable.

comprehensive overview of issues involved and in-depth comparisons between assumptions underlying both methods, see Heckman et al. (1999); Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004), and references therein.

In contrast with some third world, mainly world bank sponsored, evaluation studies<sup>2</sup>, European evaluation studies of training programs are almost exclusively non-experimental. Moreover most studies use the *timing of events* evaluation design (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003). By jointly modeling the duration of the unemployment spell and the time elapsed before a training is started, the effect of the training on the unemployment duration is purged of confounding unobserved common factors, such as motivation. The intuition is that a training can only affect the probability of finding a job ex-post, while confounders have an effect both before and after the training. At least if we rule out any anticipation effects! Examples of this approach include Richardson and van den Berg (2013) for Sweden, Hujer et al. (2006) using data for East Germany and Lalive et al. (2008) who find no effect for the Swiss unemployed. More recent approaches not only consider exit probabilities out of unemployment, but characteristics of subsequent jobs as well (Crépon et al., 2012; Osikominu, 2013).

In the Belgian context, the only readily available quantitative results on the effectiveness of training as an ALMP come from Cockx (2002), who estimates the change in exit probabilities out of unemployment due to a training organized by the Walloon public employment service (FOREM). For Flanders, sparse studies include overviews of methodological issues (Bollens2007, 2014), and a survey where participants rate the training they followed (De Rick and De Cuyper, 2014).

In this paper, we try to fill this perceived gap for Flanders by assessing the effect of training programs on the subsequent employment probability, using administrative data, which are described in section 2. The method employed is presented in section 3 and results are described in section 4, while section 5 concludes.

## 2 Data

We use data from the public employment service (*PES*) in Flanders<sup>3</sup> consisting of individual records<sup>4</sup>, whereby anyone entering unemployment is recorded at the end of the month of entrance. Moreover, we have information on the labor market position of the individual at the end of all subsequent calendar months<sup>5</sup>. From these data, we selected those individuals for which an unemployment spell involving unemployment benefits, started in 2007<sup>6</sup>. In addition were removed: the impaired<sup>7</sup>, those younger than 25 and older than 65<sup>8</sup>, disabled persons and individuals living outside Flanders. For each subject, the data runs from the first entrance in unemployment in 2007 up to the end of September 2010.

Quite obviously, duration is defined as the amount of time passed until the current state ends in favor of some other state of interest (i.e. employment), while alternative exits<sup>9</sup> as well as the end of the observation window, censor the current state. Similarly, we define a waiting time between the onset of unemployment and the start of some kind of training.

We obtained a second data-set containing data on 13067 training sessions from the *PES*, corresponding with all individuals we selected in the previous step. From these training session records, we remove the modules “person-centered training” (persoonsgerichte vorming), “job search training” (sollicitatietraining) and an “introductory module” (trajectbepaling) as well as all internet-based types of training, on the grounds that either their contents are very basic or that the training effort can not be verified. This operation removes 7622 (training) observations. Next, only entries are retained

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<sup>2</sup>Examples include Hirshleifer et al. (2015), Attanasio et al. (2011), Card et al. (2011) and Cho et al. (2013).

<sup>3</sup>Its official acronym is VDAB, or “Vlaamse Dienst voor Arbeidsbemiddeling” in full.

<sup>4</sup>The primary source of these data is the (federal) unemployment register.

<sup>5</sup>Our data are thus left-truncated and independently interval censored.

<sup>6</sup>Thus removing voluntary registered job seekers and school-leavers.

<sup>7</sup>Someone is labeled impaired (“arbeidsgehandicapt”) when (s)he is less able to obtain or perform a job due to an illness (p.ex. burn-out) or a handicap.

<sup>8</sup>With ages recorded at the onset of the unemployment spell.

<sup>9</sup>Alternative exits include: inactivity, i.e. voluntary unemployment, sickness, retirement, ...

that have a meaningful status: finished, interrupted or ongoing.<sup>10</sup> We further distinguish between successfully finished training spells on the one hand and prematurely interrupted or failed training spells on the other hand. Next, we group all training entries according to a 79-fold classification of remaining training types<sup>11</sup>, after which we remove duplicates based on the timing and the result of the training. Next, we group adjacent training spells, which we define as being no further apart than three months, into one training block, which we assign the status and result of the final spell within the block. After cleaning up the dataset on training, we end up with the situation given in Table 1.

#trainings/spell	#spells	#trainings
1	3602	3602
2	60	120
3	1	3
Total	3663	3725

Table 1: Number of training episodes per unemployment spell

If an unemployment spell contains more than one training, the onset of the second training censors the remaining unemployment spell. Likewise, if an individual’s records contain more than one unemployment spell, we use only the initial one, again, for convenience reasons. The finally concocted database thus consists of 108647 individuals starting an initial unemployment spell somewhere during 2007, of which 2389 received at least one training during their first unemployment spell.

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of our finally resulting dataset. Note that the provinces Vlaams Brabant and West Vlaanderen are slightly underrepresented, which might reflect higher provincial unemployment rates. Slightly more than half are women, 80% have Dutch as native language, while 90% have the Belgian nationality. 80% possess a drivers license. Previous unemployment history is synthesized in the number of months the individual was unemployed in the last two years prior to the start of the current unemployment spell. On average, the people in our sample have been unemployed 25% of the time. 40% in the sample have only obtained a degree in primary education, 36% secondary education, while 23% have successfully followed tertiary education, roughly 25% of which university. Educational track refers to the objective of the subject chosen in secondary education. The vocational track prepares for a direct transition to a profession, whereas the general and the technical tracks prepare for a transition to tertiary education. During 2.4% of the unemployment spells a training was followed which lasted on average 11 months. Roughly  $\frac{2}{3}$  finished the training successfully.

### 3 Modeling

Participation in a training is possibly selective, meaning that the observed and unobserved characteristics of both groups may be different, a different outcome for both groups may thus not only be a consequence of the treatment, but could also be due to these other differences. Over and above this classical selection problem, we have to take into account a dynamic selection problem, which is driven by the mechanism that the more employable workers will on average leave unemployment sooner, and therefore will have a smaller probability to be treated.

To overcome these difficulties, we control for differences between the treated group and the control group based on both observed and unobserved individual characteristics. Selection on observables is taken into account by conditioning the hazard rates on explanatory variables. Selection on unobserved characteristics is taken into account by making use of a “frailty”, which models an unobserved factor influencing both the labor market fitness and the willingness to follow a training (Abbring and van den Berg 2003, 2004). This approach is also called the Timing of Events approach. It exploits the fact that

<sup>10</sup>We thus remove 311 entries with a status that has only an administrative meaning, such as “in process”, “ready to start”, “not started”, “annulled”, . . .

<sup>11</sup>There exists a much finer, i.e. 577-fold classification of training types which proved not very helpful.

Name	Mean
Vlaams Brabant	0.1460928
West Vlaanderen	0.1647355
Oost Vlaanderen	0.2414247
Limburg	0.1466731
Antwerpen	0.3010739
Sex	0.5030764
Language Dutch	0.7987436
Belgian nationality	0.8919018
Drivers license	0.7955935
Months unemployed (past 2 years)	6.082078
Primary education	0.4073668
Secondary education	0.3649694
Tertiary education: college	0.1671948
Tertiary education: university	0.060469
Educational track: general	0.0914081
Educational track: technical	0.1662921
Educational track: vocational	0.2777338
Age (standardized)	2.64e-17
Age squared	0.9999908
#trainings/spell	0.0236257
<i>N</i>	108568
Name	Mean
Duration of training	11.40104
Passed	0.660026
<i>N</i>	2309

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

unobserved heterogeneity affects the transition to regular employment throughout the unemployment spell, whereas the treatment may only influence this transition from its onset. This difference in timing allows identification of both the treatment effect and the selection effect without imposing ‘exclusion restrictions’ on the observed explanatory variables. In what follows, we specify the econometric model and discuss the identification of the treatment effect.

### 3.1 Likelihood

Consider a state of affairs where people find themselves out of a job. During their unemployment spell they will be offered different kinds of training, which they can turn down or accept. The main question of interest in this paper is whether (different types of) training influence(s) the hazard of finding a job (differently).

At the moment of being sacked, two processes start up: a job search process,  $J$ , ending with finding a job, and a waiting process,  $W$ , ending with starting some training,  $O_k$  of type  $k = 1, \dots, K$ . The first sub-spell of an unemployment spell, ends by starting a training or by finding a job. Once the training started, one either completes the training, fails or finds a job. After the training finished, the spell ends by finding a job or by being censored.

Define the hazard rate  $\theta_P(t | \mathcal{S}_P)$  of process  $P = J, W$ ,  $k = 1, \dots, K$  as

$$\lambda_P(t | \mathcal{S}_P) = \lim_{dt \rightarrow 0} \frac{\Pr[t \leq T < t + dt | T \geq t; \mathcal{S}_P]}{dt},$$

with survival function

$$S_P(t | \mathcal{S}_P) = \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \lambda_P(u | \mathcal{S}_P) du \right\}$$

and *PDF*

$$f_P(t | \mathcal{S}_P) = \lambda_P(t | \mathcal{S}_P) \cdot S_P(t | \mathcal{S}_P).$$

The  $\mathcal{S}_P$  denotes the set of conditioning variables.

The joint distribution of  $(T_J, T_W) | (X, \Xi)$  is factored as

$$f_{(T_J, T_W) | (X, T_{O_k}, \Xi)}(t_J, t_W | x, t_{O_k}, \xi) = f_{T_J | (X, T_{O_k}, \Xi_J)}(t_J | x, t_{O_k}, \sigma_W \xi) \cdot f_{T_W | (X, \Xi_W)}(t_W | x, \xi),$$

where  $\xi$  represents the (individual-specific) unobserved heterogeneity or frailty. Conditional on this frailty and on the set of observed conditioning variables, including receiving, failed or successfully obtained training, waiting time and the unemployment duration are independent.

For convenience, we specify each conditional hazard as a proportional hazards Lancaster (1990, p.42) model<sup>12</sup>

$$\lambda_P(t | \mathcal{S}_P) = \lambda_{P0}(t) \cdot \exp[\alpha'_P x_i + \sigma_P \cdot \xi_i]$$

in which the functional form of the baseline hazard  $\lambda_{P0}(t)$  is common to all individuals. Additionally, one of the parameters  $\sigma_P$ ,  $P = J, W$  needs to be removed, i.e. fixed to the value 1.

During a complete sequence of events, an individual enters unemployment at  $s = t_J = t_W = 0$  and leaves the risk set at  $s = s^f$ . At some point  $s = s^1$ , (s)he starts some training ( $Q^k = 1$ ), which lasts until  $s = s^2 > s^1$  and ends in failure ( $F^k = 1$ ) or success ( $S^k = 1$ ). At some point in time  $s = s^E$ , (s)he finds a suitable job and leaves unemployment. Depending on the timing of  $s^E$ ,  $s^1$  and  $s^f$ , different contributions to the likelihood apply:

<sup>12</sup>Sometimes it is also called the relative risk or the Cox model (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002, p.95).



- When  $s_i^f < s_i^1$ , we do not observe the start of any training, hence spell  $J$  results in success ( $d_J = 1$ ), i.e.  $(s_i^E < s_i^f)$  or censoring ( $d_J = 0$ ), i.e.  $(s_i^f < s_i^E)$ , but  $W$  is always censored<sup>13</sup>. In case of success, we have left truncated and interval censored data for the unemployment spell (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002, section 3.9.3, p.83), otherwise, the employment spells are left truncated and right censored

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathcal{L}_I(s_i | x_i, \xi_i) \\ &= \{S_J(s_i - 1 | x_i, q_i^k = 0, s_i^k = 0, f_i^k = 0, \xi_i) - S_J(s_i | x_i, q_i^k = 0, s_i^k = 0, f_i^k = 0, \xi_i)\}^{d_J} \\ & \quad \times S_J^{(1-d_J)}(s_i | x_i, q_i^k = 0, s_i^k = 0, f_i^k = 0, \xi_i) \\ & \quad \times S_W(s_i | x_i, \xi_i) \end{aligned}$$

- When  $s_i^1 < s_i^E < s_i^2$ , the individual has *started* some training  $k$ , after which spell  $J$  results in success ( $d_J = 1$ ) or censoring ( $d_J = 0$ ), spell  $W$  results in success,

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathcal{L}_{II}(s_i | x_i, \xi_i) \\ &= \{S_J(s_i - 1 | x_i, q_i^k = 1, s_i^k = 0, f_i^k = 0, \xi_i) - S_J(s_i | x_i, q_i^k = 1, s_i^k = 0, f_i^k = 0, \xi_i)\}^{d_J} \\ & \quad \times S_J^{(1-d_J)}(s_i | x_i, q_i^k = 1, s_i^k = 0, f_i^k = 0, \xi_i) \\ & \quad \times \{S_W(s_i^1 - 1 | x_i, \xi_i) - S_W(s_i^1 | x_i, \xi_i)\} \end{aligned}$$

- When  $s_i^2 < s_i^E$ , the individual has finished the training  $k$  and thus spell  $J$  results in success ( $d_J = 1$ ) or censoring ( $d_J = 0$ ), and spell  $W$  results in success

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathcal{L}_{III}(s_i | x_i, \xi_i) \\ &= \{S_J(s_i - 1 | x_i, q_i^k = 1, s_i^k, f_i^k, \xi_i) - S_J(s_i | x_i, q_i^k = 1, s_i^k, f_i^k, \xi_i)\}^{d_J} \\ & \quad \times S_J^{(1-d_J)}(s_i | x_i, q_i^k = 1, s_i^k, f_i^k, \xi_i) \\ & \quad \times \{S_W(s_i^1 - 1 | x_i, \xi_i) - S_W(s_i^1 | x_i, \xi_i)\} \end{aligned}$$

### 3.2 Computational details

Since our data are only constructed on a monthly basis, we have to take this interval-censoring into account (Gaure et al., 2007). As a consequence people appearing for the first time in the data have already experienced an unemployment spell between one and 30 days. We do not take into account the fact that very short spells<sup>14</sup> are not observed in the data.

Both out of convenience considerations and to avoid restrictions imposed by parametric models (Heckman and Singer, 1984), we both specify the baseline hazard as well as the unobserved heterogeneity (or frailty) non-parametrically. Both baseline hazards are thus specified as piecewise-constant (*PWC*) with time intervals of one month<sup>15</sup>, ie.  $k = 1, \dots, 45$ . A convenient characteristic of a *PWC* specification is that the rather annoying integrals in the likelihood are transformed into sums. Hence we have that

$$\mathcal{L}_I(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i) = \mathcal{L}_{I;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i) \cdot \mathcal{L}_{I;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i)$$

<sup>13</sup>Note that the usual contribution of an observed success to the Likelihood  $\lambda^d(s) \cdot S(s)$  is replaced by  $\{S(s-1) - S(s)\}^d$ , due to the one month interval censoring, i.e. the individual survived until (the end of) month  $s-1$ , but left the state before (the end of) month  $s$ .

<sup>14</sup>Spells of less than one month which do not include the “recording date”.

<sup>15</sup>For the exact form of the intervals, see section 4.

where

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}_{I;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i) &= \left\{ \exp \left[ \exp [\mathcal{I}_{J;i} + \sigma_J \cdot \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \lambda_{J0}(1) - \sum_{l=1}^{k_i-1} \lambda_{J0}(l) \right\} \right] \right\}^{d_J} \\ &\quad + (-1)^{d_J} \exp \left[ \exp [\mathcal{I}_{J;i} + \sigma_J \cdot \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \lambda_{J0}(1) - \sum_{l=1}^{k_i} \lambda_{J0}(l) \right\} \right] \end{aligned}$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{I;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i) = \exp \left[ \exp [\mathcal{I}_{W;i} + \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \lambda_{W0}(1) - \sum_{l=1}^{k_i} \lambda_{W0}(l) \right\} \right]$$

for individuals never entering training, with  $\mathcal{I}_{P;i} = \alpha'_P x_i$ ,  $P = J, W$ ; that

$$\mathcal{L}_{II}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i) = \mathcal{L}_{II;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i) \cdot \mathcal{L}_{II;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i)$$

with

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathcal{L}_{II;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i) \\ &= \left\{ \left\{ \exp \left[ \exp [\mathcal{I}_{J;i} + \sigma_J \cdot \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \lambda_{J0}(1) - \sum_{l=1}^{k_i^s-1} \lambda_{J0}(l) \right\} - \exp [\mathcal{I}_{J;i} + \beta_I q_i + \sigma_J \cdot \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \sum_{l=k_i^s}^{k_i-1} \lambda_{J0}(l) \right\} \right] \right\} \right\}^{d_J} \\ &\quad + (-1)^{d_J} \exp \left[ \exp [\mathcal{I}_{J;i} + \sigma_J \cdot \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \lambda_{J0}(1) - \sum_{l=1}^{k_i^s-1} \lambda_{J0}(l) \right\} - \exp [\mathcal{I}_{J;i} + \beta_I q_i + \sigma_J \cdot \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \sum_{l=k_i^s}^{k_i} \lambda_{J0}(l) \right\} \right] \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathcal{L}_{II;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i) \\ &= \exp \left[ \exp [\mathcal{I}_{W;i} + \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \lambda_{W0}(1) - \sum_{l=1}^{k_i^s-1} \lambda_{W0}(l) \right\} \right] - \exp \left[ \exp [\mathcal{I}_{W;i} + \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \lambda_{W0}(1) - \sum_{l=2}^{k_i^s} \lambda_{W0}(l) \right\} \right] \end{aligned}$$

for individuals starting training; and that

$$\mathcal{L}_{III}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i) = \mathcal{L}_{III;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i) \cdot \mathcal{L}_{III;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mathcal{L}_{III;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i) \\
= & \left\{ \exp \left[ \exp [\mathcal{I}_{J;i} + \sigma_J \cdot \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \lambda_{J0}(1) - \sum_{l=1}^{k_i^s - 1} \lambda_{J0}(l) \right\} - \exp [\mathcal{I}_{J;i} + \beta_I q_i + \sigma_J \cdot \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \sum_{l=k_i^s}^{k_i^e - 1} \lambda_{J0}(l) \right\} \right] \right. \\
& - \sum_{m=1}^{M_S} s_i \cdot \left\{ \exp [\mathcal{I}_{J;i} + \gamma_{AS;m} + \sigma_J \cdot \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \sum_{l=k_i^e + b_m}^{k_i^e + e_m} (l \leq k_i - 1) \cdot \lambda_{J0}(l) \right\} \right\} \\
& - \sum_{m=1}^{M_F} f_i \cdot \left\{ \exp [\mathcal{I}_{J;i} + \gamma_{AF;m} + \sigma_J \cdot \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \sum_{l=k_i^e + b_m}^{k_i^e + e_m} (l \leq k_i - 1) \cdot \lambda_{J0}(l) \right\} \right\} \Bigg\}^{d_J} \\
& + (-1)^{d_J} \exp \left[ \exp [\mathcal{I}_{J;i} + \sigma_J \cdot \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \lambda_{J0}(1) - \sum_{l=1}^{k_i^s - 1} \lambda_{J0}(l) \right\} - \exp [\mathcal{I}_{J;i} + \beta_I q_i + \sigma_J \cdot \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \sum_{l=k_i^s}^{k_i^e - 1} \lambda_{J0}(l) \right\} \right] \\
& - \sum_{m=1}^{M_S} s_i \cdot \left\{ \exp [\mathcal{I}_{J;i} + \gamma_{AS;m} + \sigma_J \cdot \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \sum_{l=k_i^e + b_m}^{k_i^e + e_m} (l \leq k_i) \cdot \lambda_{J0}(l) \right\} \right\} \\
& - \sum_{m=1}^{M_F} f_i \cdot \left\{ \exp [\mathcal{I}_{J;i} + \gamma_{AF;m} + \sigma_J \cdot \xi_i] \cdot \left\{ \sum_{l=k_i^e + b_m}^{k_i^e + e_m} (l \leq k_i) \cdot \lambda_{J0}(l) \right\} \right\} \Bigg]
\end{aligned}$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{III;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i) = \mathcal{L}_{II;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_i, d_i)$$

for individuals finishing training. The log-likelihood is now given by

$$\begin{aligned}
\log \mathcal{L}(k_i | x_i) &= \log \mathcal{L}_I(k_i | x_i, d_i = 0) + \log \mathcal{L}_I(k_i | x_i, d_i = 1) \\
&+ \log \mathcal{L}_{II}(k_i | x_i, d_i = 0) + \log \mathcal{L}_{II}(k_i | x_i, d_i = 1) \\
&+ \log \mathcal{L}_{III}(k_i | x_i, d_i = 0) + \log \mathcal{L}_{III}(k_i | x_i, d_i = 1),
\end{aligned}$$

since the 6 distinct cases are mutually exclusive, where

$$\log \mathcal{L}_X(k_i | x_i, d_i) = \log \left[ \sum_{p=1}^P \mathcal{L}_X(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i) \times \pi_p \right],$$

with  $(\xi_p, \pi_p)$  denoting the  $p^{th}$  mass point of the non-parametrically specified frailty. Note that the zero-mean frailty is thus specified by  $2(P-1)$  free parameters, since  $\sum_{p=1}^P \pi_p = 1$ , which can be obtained by the reparametrization

$$\pi_p = \begin{cases} \frac{\exp[\kappa_p]}{1 + \sum_{p=1}^{P-1} \exp[\kappa_p]} & p < P \\ \frac{1}{1 + \sum_{p=1}^{P-1} \exp[\kappa_p]} & p = P \end{cases},$$

and since  $\sum_{p=1}^P \xi_p \pi_p = 0$ , which can be obtained by eliminating  $\xi_P$

$$\xi_P = - \sum_{p=1}^{P-1} \xi_p \exp[\kappa_p].$$

In addition, in order for the  $\lambda_{P0}(l) \in [0, 1]$ , with  $P = J, W$ , we reparametrize them as

$$\lambda_{P0}(l) = \frac{\exp[\mu_{P0}(l)]}{\exp[\mu_{P0}(l)] + \exp[-\mu_{P0}(l)]},$$

with inverse transform

$$\mu_{P0}(l) = \frac{1}{2} \ln \left[ \frac{\lambda_{P0}(l)}{1 - \lambda_{P0}(l)} \right].$$

From this we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \lambda_{P0}(l)}{\partial \mu_{P0}(l)} &= \frac{2}{(\exp[\mu_{P0}(l)] + \exp[-\mu_{P0}(l)])^2}, \\ \frac{\partial^2 \lambda_{P0}(l)}{(\partial \mu_{P0}(l))^2} &= \frac{-4(\exp[\mu_{P0}(l)] - \exp[-\mu_{P0}(l)])}{(\exp[\mu_{P0}(l)] + \exp[-\mu_{P0}(l)])^3}, \end{aligned}$$

hence

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial F(\lambda_{P0}(l))}{\partial \mu_{P0}(l)} &= \frac{\partial F(\lambda_{P0}(l))}{\partial \lambda_{P0}(l)} \cdot \frac{\partial \lambda_{P0}(l)}{\partial \mu_{P0}(l)} \\ \frac{\partial^2 F(\lambda_{P0}(l))}{(\partial \mu_{P0}(l))^2} &= \frac{\partial^2 F(\lambda_{P0}(l))}{(\partial \lambda_{P0}(l))^2} \cdot \left( \frac{\partial \lambda_{P0}(l)}{\partial \mu_{P0}(l)} \right)^2 + \frac{\partial F(\lambda_{P0}(l))}{\partial \lambda_{P0}(l)} \cdot \frac{\partial^2 \lambda_{P0}(l)}{(\partial \mu_{P0}(l))^2} \\ \frac{\partial^2 F(\lambda_{P0}(l), \lambda_{P0}(l'))}{(\partial \mu_{P0}(l))(\partial \mu_{P0}(l'))} &= \frac{\partial^2 F(\lambda_{P0}(l), \lambda_{P0}(l'))}{(\partial \lambda_{P0}(l))(\partial \lambda_{P0}(l'))} \cdot \left( \frac{\partial \lambda_{P0}(l)}{\partial \mu_{P0}(l)} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{\partial \lambda_{P0}(l')}{\partial \mu_{P0}(l')} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Further details can be found in Appendix A.

## 4 Results

A first issue that needs to be discussed is the choice of the intervals within which the hazard rates are constant. Since the data are observed with monthly intervals, this would be a natural choice. However, in order to avoid identification problems caused by empty cells, we choose one long final interval. In order to decide the length of this final interval, we computed monthly hazard rates (see figure 1) and their variances unconditional on any covariate. We then looked for the first month with less than 20 exits or with a lower 95% confidence limit  $< 0$ . The last interval starts at said first month (and runs to the end of the observation period). For the exit to training, we thus obtain 21 intervals and for the exit to work 40.

Table 3 summarises parameters of interest<sup>16</sup>: the different effects of following a training on the exit to work and  $\sigma_J$ , the factor by which the waiting time frailty enters the unemployment duration equation. The left part of table 3 gives the results for a benchmark model without unobserved heterogeneity, the the right part gives the results for a model including a 3-point frailty. Focussing on the latter results, we conclude that there exists a significant locking-in of training: during the training the probability of exit to work diminishes with 8%. After a successful training, the probability of exit to work increases to 1.81 times the probability without training during the first six months after the training. The next six months it is even raised to 1.99 times, while the second year the effect seems to wear off slightly. After two years, the effect of the training seems to have returned to zero. Remarkably, even an unsuccessful training has a positive impact on the exit to work. The parameter  $\sigma_J$ , is significantly negative, meaning that people who start earlier with a training on average have a longer unemployment duration. The frailty thus does not capture unobserved motivation, but seems to reflect the fact that during the period of observation, the PES explicitly targeted individuals deemed weakly employable, who were less inclined to turn down training offers.

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<sup>16</sup>The full tables of results can be found in Appendix B




Figure 1: Non-parametric unconditional estimates of the hazards for the exit to training (left) and the exit to work (right)

	Piecewise Constant, no frailty				Piecewise constant, 3 point frailty			
	<i>b</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>p</i>	factor	<i>b</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>p</i>	factor
during training	-0.11	0.03	0.001	0.90	-0.08	0.03	0.009	0.92
after training, month 1 – 6	0.58	0.06	0.000	1.79	0.60	0.06	0.000	1.81
after training, month 7 – 12	0.68	0.11	0.000	1.98	0.69	0.11	0.000	1.99
after training, month 13 – 24	0.52	0.17	0.003	1.68	0.53	0.17	0.002	1.69
after training, month $\geq 25$	-0.26	0.71	0.713	0.77	-0.23	0.71	0.744	0.79
after unsuccessful training	0.24	0.09	0.006	1.27	0.25	0.09	0.005	1.28
$\sigma_J$	/	/	/	/	-0.05	0.01	0.000	/

Table 3: The effect of training on the probability of employment

## 5 Conclusion

In this paper we estimated the effect of training on the exit to work hazard using the timing of events approach. Next to a significant but small locking in effect, we find a positive effect of training on the exit to work probability, which is almost doubled<sup>17</sup> in the first year after the training and still 70% higher in the second year.

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<sup>17</sup>Compared to the no training exit to work probability.

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## A Derivatives of the Log-likelihood

The unconditional likelihood is obtained by mixing out the frailty

$$\mathcal{L}(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha) = \sum_{p=1}^P \mathcal{L}_J(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_J) \cdot \mathcal{L}_W(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_W) \times \pi_p$$

Since the cases we consider are mutually exclusive, it holds that

$$\mathcal{L}(k_i | x_i, d_i) = \prod_{\substack{c = I, II, III \\ d = 0, 1}} \mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i),$$

where

$$\mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i) = \sum_{p=1}^P \mathcal{L}_{c;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_J) \cdot \mathcal{L}_{c;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_W) \times \pi_p$$

with  $c = I, II, III$ . Hence, we have that

$$\ln \mathcal{L}(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha) = \sum_{\substack{c = I, II, III \\ d = 0, 1}} \ln \mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha),$$

where

$$\ln \mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha) = \ln \left[ \sum_{p=1}^P \mathcal{L}_{c;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_J) \cdot \mathcal{L}_{c;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_W) \times \pi_p \right].$$

### A.0.1 Gradient

So, in general, we have that

$$\frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha)}{\partial \alpha'_J} = \{\mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha)\}^{-1} \cdot \left\{ \sum_{p=1}^P \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_{c;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_J)}{\partial \alpha'_J} \cdot \mathcal{L}_{c;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_W) \times \pi_p \right\}$$

$$\frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha)}{\partial \alpha'_W} = \{\mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha)\}^{-1} \cdot \left\{ \sum_{p=1}^P \mathcal{L}_{c;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_J) \cdot \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_{c;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_W)}{\partial \alpha'_W} \times \pi_p \right\}$$

$$\frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha)}{\partial \pi_p} = \{\mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha)\}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{L}_{c;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_J) \cdot \mathcal{L}_{c;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_W)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha)}{\partial \xi_p} &= \{\mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha)\}^{-1} \cdot \left\{ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_{c;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_J)}{\partial \xi_p} \cdot \mathcal{L}_{c;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_W) \right. \\ &\quad \left. \cdot \mathcal{L}_{c;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_J) \cdot \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_{c;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_W)}{\partial \xi_p} \right\} \cdot \pi_p \\ &= \{\mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha)\}^{-1} \cdot \left\{ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_{c;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_J)}{\partial \mathcal{I}_{J;i}} \cdot \sigma_J \cdot \mathcal{L}_{c;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_W) \right. \\ &\quad \left. \cdot + \mathcal{L}_{c;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_J) \cdot \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_{c;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_W)}{\partial \mathcal{I}_{W;i}} \right\} \cdot \pi_p \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha)}{\partial \sigma_J} &= \{\mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha)\}^{-1} \cdot \left\{ \sum_{p=1}^P \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_{c;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_J)}{\partial \sigma_J} \cdot \mathcal{L}_{c;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_W) \times \pi_p \right\} \\ &= \{\mathcal{L}_c(k_i | x_i, d_i; \alpha)\}^{-1} \cdot \left\{ \sum_{p=1}^P \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_{c;J}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_J)}{\partial \mathcal{I}_{J;i}} \cdot \xi_p \cdot \mathcal{L}_{c;W}(k_i | x_i, \xi_p, d_i; \alpha_W) \times \pi_p \right\}. \end{aligned}$$



We further have to take into account the re-parametrization  $\pi_p \rightarrow \kappa_q$  and the elimination of  $\xi_P$

$$\xi_P = - \sum_{p=1}^{P-1} \xi_p \exp[\kappa_p].$$

## B Full Estimation Results

Equation	Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>p</i>	
Exit to training	Sex	0.04	0.05	0.434	
	Age (standardized)	0.37	0.03	0.000	
	Age squared	-0.64	0.03	0.000	
	Months unemployed (past 2 years)	-0.01	0.00	0.095	
	Primary education	0.58	0.14	0.000	
	Secondary education	0.48	0.15	0.001	
	Tertiary education: college	0.31	0.14	0.029	
	Educational track: general	0.09	0.10	0.337	
	Educational track: technical	0.18	0.08	0.023	
	Educational track: vocational	0.12	0.07	0.087	
	Vlaams Brabant	0.16	0.08	0.032	
	West Vlaanderen	0.35	0.07	0.000	
	Oost Vlaanderen	0.20	0.06	0.001	
	Limburg	0.22	0.07	0.002	
	Drivers license	0.18	0.06	0.003	
	Language Dutch	0.75	0.07	0.000	
	Belgian nationality	0.24	0.09	0.010	
	Exit to work	Sex	-0.10	0.01	0.000
		Age (standardized)	-0.21	0.00	0.000
		Age squared	-0.07	0.00	0.000
Months unemployed (past 2 years)		0.00	0.00	0.449	
Primary education		-0.11	0.01	0.000	
Secondary education		-0.08	0.02	0.000	
Tertiary education: college		0.08	0.01	0.000	
Educational track: general		-0.07	0.02	0.000	
Educational track: technical		0.00	0.01	0.989	
Educational track: vocational		0.02	0.01	0.065	
Vlaams Brabant		0.02	0.01	0.142	
West Vlaanderen		0.18	0.01	0.000	
Oost Vlaanderen		0.03	0.01	0.004	
Limburg		0.07	0.01	0.000	
Drivers license		0.22	0.01	0.000	
Language Dutch		0.26	0.01	0.000	
Belgian nationality		0.08	0.01	0.000	
Training effects		during training	-0.11	0.03	0.001
		after training, month 1 – 6	0.58	0.06	0.000
		after training, month 7 – 12	0.68	0.11	0.000
	after training, month 13 – 24	0.52	0.17	0.003	
	after training, month $\geq$ 25	-0.26	0.71	0.713	
	after unsuccessful training	0.24	0.09	0.006	

Table 4: Results PWC without frailty, baseline hazard parameters not shown

Equation	Variable	<i>b</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>p</i>
Exit to training	Sex	0.04	0.05	0.430
	Age (standardized)	0.38	0.03	0.000
	Age squared	-0.65	0.03	0.000
	Months unemployed (past 2 years)	-0.01	0.00	0.062
	Primary education	0.59	0.14	0.000
	Secondary education	0.48	0.15	0.001
	Tertiary education: college	0.32	0.14	0.028
	Educational track: general	0.11	0.10	0.272
	Educational track: technical	0.17	0.08	0.033
	Educational track: vocational	0.12	0.07	0.098
	Vlaams Brabant	0.16	0.08	0.034
	West Vlaanderen	0.34	0.07	0.000
	Oost Vlaanderen	0.20	0.06	0.001
	Limburg	0.23	0.07	0.002
	Drivers license	0.19	0.06	0.002
	Language Dutch	0.76	0.07	0.000
	Belgian nationality	0.25	0.09	0.008
	Exit to work	Sex	-0.10	0.01
Age (standardized)		-0.21	0.00	0.000
Age squared		-0.07	0.00	0.000
Months unemployed (past 2 years)		0.00	0.00	0.434
Primary education		-0.11	0.01	0.000
Secondary education		-0.08	0.02	0.000
Tertiary education: college		0.08	0.01	0.000
Educational track: general		-0.07	0.02	0.000
Educational track: technical		0.00	0.01	0.985
Educational track: vocational		0.02	0.01	0.065
Vlaams Brabant		0.02	0.01	0.141
West Vlaanderen		0.18	0.01	0.000
Oost Vlaanderen		0.03	0.01	0.005
Limburg		0.07	0.01	0.000
Drivers license		0.22	0.01	0.000
Language Dutch		0.26	0.01	0.000
Belgian nationality		0.08	0.01	0.000
Training effects		during training	-0.08	0.03
	after training, month 1 – 6	0.60	0.06	0.000
	after training, month 7 – 12	0.69	0.11	0.000
	after training, month 13 – 24	0.53	0.17	0.002
	after training, month $\geq 25$	-0.23	0.71	0.744
	after unsuccessful training	0.25	0.09	0.005
Frailty parameters	Probability 1	2.46	0.31	0.000
	Probability 2	7.92	0.32	0.000
	Value 1	-2.51	0.00	0.000
	Value 2	0.01	0.00	0.000
	$\sigma_J$	-0.05	0.01	0.000

Table 5: Results PWC with 3 point frailty, baseline hazard parameters not shown